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When an observed action (e.g., kicking) is compatible to a to be produced action (e.g., a
foot-key response as compared to a ﬁnger-key response), then the self-produced action is more
ﬂuent, that is, it is more accurate and faster. A series of experiments explore the notion that
vision–action compatibility eﬀects can inﬂuence personal-trait judgments. It is demonstrated
that when an observed individual carries out an action that is compatible with the participants
response, (1) this individual is identiﬁed more ﬂuently, and (2) the observed individuals per-
sonality is attributed with the properties of the observed action. For example, if it is easier to
identify one individual with a foot-response when he is seen kicking a ball, as compared to
typing, he is perceived to be more sporty. In contrast, if it is easier to identify one individual
with a ﬁnger response when he is seen typing as compared to kicking a ball, he is associated
with the academic trait. These personal-trait judgment eﬀects can be observed with explicit
measures, where participants are asked to rate the sporty/academic nature of the person on
a scale. They are also obtained when implicit measures are taken in a priming task, where par-
ticipants are never explicitly asked to rate the personalities of the individuals. A control exper-
iment rules out that these personal-trait eﬀects are merely due to an association of motor
responses (foot, ﬁnger) to individuals while identifying them, but that these eﬀects depend
on a prior manipulation of vision–action ﬂuency.
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There is mounting evidence that human cognition – social and other – does
not rely on amodal representations, but is grounded in the perceptual and motor
systems. Accordingly, the representations of an entity or an event consist of the
relevant perceptual and motor states that were present when these things were
experienced (e.g., Barsalou, 1999, 2003; Glenberg, 1997; Zwaan, Stanﬁeld, & Yax-
ley, 2002).
Perceived actions, in particular, seem to activate the representations an observer
would use to produce the same actions (e.g., Hommel, Mu¨sseler, Aschersleben, &
Prinz, 2001; Iacoboni, 2005). It has been found that actions are more ﬂuent – fast-
er and more accurate – when the actor concurrently perceives another person car-
ry out the same action (e.g., Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschla¨ger, & Prinz, 2000;
Castiello, 2003; Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Kilner, Paulignan,
& Blakemore, 2003; Stu¨rmer, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2000). Neurophysiological
ﬁndings provided a neuronal substrate for these processes. DiPellegrino and col-
leagues have discovered neurons in the macaque premotor cortex that ﬁre if the
monkey produces a particular action, but also if it observes another individual
produce the same action (DiPellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti,
1992). Evidence for this so-called mirror system is now well established in mon-
key (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996) and human (e.g., Buccino et al.,
2001; Gre`zes, Armony, Rowe, & Passingham, 2003; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, &
Fogassi, 1996).
The notion that perceived actions were matched directly (Rizzolatti, Fogassi, &
Gallese, 2000) to the corresponding action representations of the observer had a sig-
niﬁcant impact on research in social cognition. Perception–action matching process-
es may form the basis of observational learning (e.g., Elsner & Aschersleben, 2003;
Liberman & Mattingly, 1985; Stefan et al., 2005) and are also critical for smooth and
coherent social intercourse. Humans mimic the gestures, body postures, and facial
expression of the persons they interact with. Although completely unconscious
and non-strategic, this mimicking behavior facilitates social interactions and bond-
ing between people (e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). For instance, when Van Baaren,
Holland, Steenaert, and van Knippenberg (2003) required a waitress to either mimic
(repeat back) or not mimic a food order made by a customer, the level of tips
received was signiﬁcantly higher in the mimicking case (see Van Baaren, Holland,
Kawakami, & van Knippenberg, 2004 for other examples of pro-social behavior
evoked by action mimicking).
According to embodied and motor accounts of social cognition (e.g., Barsalou,
Niedenthal, Barbey, & Ruppert, 2003; Blakemore & Decety, 2001; Preston & de
Waal, 2002; for a critique, see Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005) these ﬁndings imply that
observers simulate the bodily states of other persons on the basis of their own sen-
sorimotor systems. By putting themselves into the shoes of others, they gain empath-
ic insights into these persons personalities, goals, and emotional states (e.g., Gallese,
2001, 2003; Preston & de Waal, 2002; for a neuronal mechanism that could drive
such inferences, see Barsalou et al., 2003). Perception–action matching mechanisms
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intention reading, Theory Of Mind, or the attribution of emotional states and per-
sonal traits to other persons (e.g., Blakemore & Decety, 2001; Gallese & Metzinger,
2003; Iacoboni, 2005). A malfunctioning mirror system might also underlie the social
deﬁcits of the autistic disorder (e.g., Nishitani, Avikainen, & Hari, 2004; Williams,
Whiten, Suddendorf, & Perrett, 2001).
Consistent with such simulation accounts of social perception, it has been found
that empathic people exhibit more mimicking behavior than non-empathic people
(e.g., Sonnby-Borgstro¨m, Jo¨nsson, & Svensson, 2003). Similarly, lesion and imaging
studies show that partially overlapping brain areas process facial expressions and
painful experiences of self and other (e.g., Adolphs, Damasio, Tranel, Cooper, &
Damasio, 2000; Morrison, Lloyd, DiPellegrino, & Roberts, 2004), and there is evi-
dence that an intact premotor cortex (i.e., mirror system) is required to attribute per-
sonality traits via observation of a persons actions (Heberlein, Adolphs, Tranel, &
Damasio, 2004). The notion that the mirror system was impaired in autism has also
been supported by recent studies. In contrast to healthy subjects, autistic individuals
do not always exhibit motor facilitation during action observation (The´oret et al.,
2005).
The aim of the present work was to provide direct evidence for vision–action
matching accounts of social perception by demonstrating that the attribution of per-
sonal traits relies on processes in the observers action system. Our experimental par-
adigm rests on the following notion: if the observers action system is involved in
social perception, then manipulations that aﬀect the action system of the observer
should also inﬂuence how other persons are viewed. Similar research strategies have
been applied before to show that the state of the observers action system aﬀects, for
instance, the perceived movement direction of illusory revolving ﬁgures (Wohlschla¨-
ger, 2000), the perceived weight of a box lifted by another person (Hamilton, Wol-
pert, & Frith, 2004), or the perceived movement speed of point light walkers (Jacobs
& Shiﬀrar, 2005). Similar techniques have also been applied in research on embodied
(social) cognition. For instance, Strack, Martin, and Stepper (1988) have shown that
manipulations that induce smiles or frowns also aﬀect how funny the participants
rated cartoons they perceived at the same time (for a review of related ﬁndings,
see Barsalou et al., 2003). Here, we extend this logic to investigate whether the ﬂu-
ency states of the observers action system becomes associated with the actions other
people carry out at the same time, and hence inﬂuence how the personality of these
people is perceived.
Consider the following experimental situation. The participants task is to iden-
tify two individuals: if it is George, press a key with the right index ﬁnger, if John,
press a foot key with the right foot. The individuals are presented carrying out
either a sporty action (kicking a ball) or an academic action (typing on a key-
board). It is predicted that the depicted actions should inﬂuence the ﬂuency with
which the foot- and ﬁnger-key responses are executed, even though they are irrel-
evant to the task of person identiﬁcation. Thus, the right ﬁnger-key press response
to identify George will be faster and more accurate when he is carrying out the
academic action (typing) than when he is carrying out the sporty action (kicking
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identify John.
Such vision–action compatibility eﬀects would conﬁrm prior studies showing that
observed actions and to be executed responses rely on overlapping representations in
the observers action system (cf. Brass et al., 2000; Stu¨rmer et al., 2000). What is nov-
el about our approach is the idea that the manipulation of vision–action compatibil-
ity might also inﬂuence what kind of people George and John are perceived to be.
That is, because the ﬁnger-key press to identify George is more ﬂuent when he is
carrying out the academic action than when carrying out the sporty action, it is pre-
dicted that participants will report that he is a more academic than sporty person. In
contrast, because the foot response to identify John will be more ﬂuent when he is
carrying out the sporty action of kicking a ball than when carrying out the academic
action of typing, the participants will rate him as more sporty than academic.
To brieﬂy preview our ﬁndings: it is indeed the case that the ﬂuency of the partic-
ipants responses aﬀected the attribution of personal traits to the individuals. These
personality-trait judgment eﬀects can be observed with both explicit measures where
participants are asked to rate the sporty/academic nature of George and John on a
scale, and when implicit measures are taken in a priming task where participants are
never explicitly asked to rate the personalities of the individuals. A control experi-
ment rules out that these eﬀects are merely due to an association of motor responses
to individuals, and shows that a prior manipulation of vision–action ﬂuency is crit-
ical to aﬀect personal-trait judgments.2. Experiment 1: Action movies
In Experiment 1, the participants were presented with movies of two individuals
(George or John) carrying out either an academic action (typing on a keyboard) or
a sporty action (kicking a ball). In a speeded response task, the participants had to
identify the two persons by pressing either a ﬁnger or a foot key. Thus, the partici-
pants responses to identify a particular individual were either compatible with the
sporty action carried out by this individual and incompatible with the academic
action, or vice versa. We predicted that the compatibility between observed action
and executed response should inﬂuence, ﬁrst, the ﬂuency with which the identiﬁca-
tion responses are executed; and second, the personality traits attributed to the
two individuals.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
Thirty-two students (27 females) ranging in age from 18 to 42 years participated in
the study. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The key
assignment of actors (George/John) to response keys (foot/ﬁnger) was counterbal-
anced across participants. All participants ﬁlled out the Autism-Spectrum Quotient
(Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001) before taking part
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current sample).
2.1.2. Material and apparatus
The experiment was controlled by Presentation run on a 3.0 GHz PC running
Windows XP. Eight movies made up the stimulus set (see Fig. 1 for examples).
The movies lasted 1100 ms each and subtended 5 visual angle vertically and 8 hor-
izontally, given an average viewing distance of 60 cm. Two of these movies showed
John or George kicking a football, and two movies showed John or George hitting a
key on a computer keyboard. In these four movies, the movement direction was
always from left to right. To exclude possible confounds arising from compatibility
of movement direction and response, for each of these four movies a mirror-inverted
version was created, in which the movement direction was from right to left.
2.1.3. Procedure and design
The participants were seated in a dimly lit room facing a color monitor at a dis-
tance of 60 cm. After the computer-driven instruction and a short training phase of
16 trials the experiment properly started. It lasted for about 15 min and consisted of
320 trials. The eight diﬀerent movies were presented at equal rates in a randomized
order. Thus, there were 160 trials in which the actor had to be identiﬁed by a ﬁnger
response. In these trials, he was equally often typing on a computer keyboard (com-
patible) or kicking a football (incompatible). In the remaining 160 trials, the actor
had to be identiﬁed with a foot response. In these trials, he was again either kicking
a ball (compatible) or typing on the computer keyboard (incompatible).
The course of each trial was as follows: After the participants initiated the trial by
pressing the space bar with their left hand, the movie was presented after 500 ms.
They identiﬁed John or George by either pressing the foot pedal with their right foot
or the enter button on the computer keyboard with their right index ﬁnger. Partic-
ipants were instructed to give their judgment in the interval in which the movieTable 1
The AQ-scores of the participants in the three experiments
Range Mean/SD Low Intermediate High
Experiment 1 8–27 16.3/4.8 23 9 —
Experiment 2 9–28 17.4/5.5 21 11 —
Experiment 3 7–36 15.8/6.2 24 7 1
Baron-Cohen 5–37 16.4/6.5 119 51 4
The second column shows the range of the scores in each experiment, and the third column shows the
mean AQ-scores and standard deviations. The third, fourth, and ﬁfth columns show how many of the
participants in each experiment fell into the ranges in which few autistic traits were present (low), the range
in which some autistic traits are present (intermediate, AQ-scores of 20+), and in the range that indicates
autistic traits in a similar extent as in individuals with clinical diagnoses of autism (high, AQ-scores of
32+). Ranges were deﬁned according to Baron-Cohen and colleagues (2001). The last row shows the
corresponding data for the non-clinical control group tested in the original publication (Baron-Cohen
et al., 2001).
Fig. 1. Examples for the movies used in Experiment 1 (action movies). The upper two rows show the
sporty kicking actions carried out by the two individuals. The lower two rows show the academic typing
actions carried out by the two individuals.
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they committed an error or did not react in the given response interval of 1100 ms, an
error message was displayed.
After the experiment was ﬁnished, a short questionnaire was presented on the
computer screen. The participants had to indicate on a scale from 4 (not at all)
to 4 (very much) how sporty they imagined the two actors to be (presented by name
and an image of their face). They answered the same question with regard to whether
they imagined the two individuals to be academic persons or not. The order in which
P. Bach, S.P. Tipper / Cognition 102 (2007) 151–178 157these questions were presented was counterbalanced across participants (i.e.,
whether they rated George or John ﬁrst and whether they gave ratings of sporty-ness
before academic-ness).
2.2. Results
2.2.1. Vision–action ﬂuency
For the analysis of RTs (Fig. 2, upper left panel), trials in which the participants
pressed the wrong button or did not react in the given reaction time interval were
excluded (8%). The remaining RTs were entered into a repeated measurements
ANOVA with the within-subjects factors Response (foot/ﬁnger) and Observed
Action (kicking/typing). A main eﬀect of Response was obtained (F [1,31] = 175.2,
p < .0001, partial eta squared = .85). Participants were faster in responding with
the ﬁnger than with the foot. There was no main eﬀect of Observed ActionFig. 2. The upper two panels show the vision–action compatibility eﬀects obtained in Experiment 1
(action movies) for RTs (upper left panel) and Error rates (upper right panel). The bars on the left show
the data when an individual had to be identiﬁed with a ﬁnger response and the bars on the right show the
data when an individual had to be identiﬁed with a foot response. The white bars show the data when the
person was presented typing on a keyboard. The black bars show the data for when the person was kicking
a football. The lower two panels show the person-trait judgment eﬀects obtained for John (lower left
panel) and George (lower right panel). The bars on the left show the ratings of how sporty a person
appeared. The bars on the right show how academic a person appeared. The white bars show the data for
when the person was identiﬁed by a ﬁnger response. The black bars show the data for when the person was
identiﬁed by a foot response.
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typing or kicking. Finally, the predicted two-way interaction of Response and
Observed Action was marginally signiﬁcant (F [1,31] = 3.0, p = .093, partial eta
squared = .09). When identifying an individual with a foot response, RTs were faster
when the person was seen kicking a ball than when typing. When identifying an indi-
vidual with a ﬁnger key-press, RTs were faster when viewing a typing action than
when viewing a kicking action.
The analysis of the Error Rates (Fig. 2, upper right panel) did not reveal main
eﬀects for Response (F [1, 30] < 1) or Observed Action (F [1,31] < 1). Therefore, foot
and hand responses were equally accurate and the individuals were identiﬁed equally
reliably when they were presented typing or kicking. However, the interaction of
Response and Observed Action was highly signiﬁcant (F [1,31] = 9.2, p = .005 partial
eta squared = .23). Hand responses were more accurate when typing actions were
observed than when kicking actions were observed. Conversely, foot responses were
more accurate when kicking actions were observed than when typing actions were
observed.
2.2.2. Personal-trait judgments
Before analyzing the data of the personal-trait judgment task (Fig. 2, lower pan-
els), we checked whether the two persons were rated diﬀerently on the two traits. To
this end, the data were entered into a repeated measures ANOVA with the factors
Person (John, George) and Trait (academic, sporty). There was a main eﬀect of Trait
(F [1,31] = 16.0, p < .0001, partial eta squared = .34) and a main eﬀect of Person
(F [1,31] = 7.0, p = .012, partial eta squared = .19). Overall, the two individuals were
rated to be more academic than sporty, and John generally received higher ratings
than George. However, there also was an interaction of Person and Trait
(F [1,31] = 22.2, p < .0001, partial eta squared = .42). Thus, the two persons were rat-
ed diﬀerently on the two traits. John was judged sportier than George, but less aca-
demic than George.
Note that these diﬀerences had to be eliminated in order to obtain a pure measure
of the eﬀect of Response on the personal-trait judgments. That is, for each partici-
pant, the diﬀerence between the person identiﬁed with a foot response and the person
identiﬁed with a ﬁnger response also reﬂects diﬀerences that are intrinsic to the two
individuals, which had to be identiﬁed with these responses. Therefore, from each
participants rating of the two people on each trait, the mean rating of this person
on this trait across all participants was subtracted. This procedure eliminated all dif-
ferences between the two individuals on the two traits but preserved the eﬀects of
Response on the personal-trait judgments. The data were then entered into a two-
way ANOVA with the within-subjects factors Trait (academic/sporty) and Response
(person identiﬁed with a ﬁnger response/foot response). There was no main eﬀect of
Response (F < 1), showing that the two persons were rated equally irrespective of
whether they were identiﬁed with a foot or a ﬁnger response. Due to the normaliza-
tion procedure described above, the eﬀect of Trait was eliminated (F = 0). However,
the predicted interaction of Trait and Response was signiﬁcant (F [1,31] = 7.4,
p = .011, partial eta squared = .19). Thus, a person was judged more academic when
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foot response. A person appeared sportier when he was identiﬁed with a foot
response compared to when he was identiﬁed with a ﬁnger response.
2.3. Discussion
The present experiment demonstrated for the ﬁrst time that the compatibility
between observed actions with to be produced responses aﬀects not only the ﬂuency
of the participants responses, but also the attribution of personal traits to the
observed individuals. Foot-key responses were more ﬂuent when the identiﬁed per-
son was carrying out the sporty action (kicking a ball) compared to when he was car-
rying out the academic action (typing). This person was later judged to be sportier.
Finger-key responses were more ﬂuent when the identiﬁed person was carrying out
the academic action compared to when the person was carrying out the sporty
action. This person was perceived to be more academic. These vision–action person-
al-trait eﬀects were observed for the ratings of both John and George, although the
two individuals were rated quite diﬀerently (John was rated more sporty than aca-
demic; George was rated more academic than sporty).
It is essential to conﬁrm in further experiments that the present eﬀects on person-
al-trait judgments were indeed caused by the prior manipulation of vision–action ﬂu-
ency. Participants have been exposed to equal numbers of sporty and academic
scenes for each individual. Therefore, the results are not an artifact of stimulus expo-
sure. However, each participant always pressed the same key to identify a particular
person. Consequently, one person could have become associated with a foot
response, while the other person was associated with a ﬁnger response over the
course of the ﬁrst part of the experiment. The bias to sporty or academic would then
be due to an association of motor responses with individuals, if one assumes that
foot responses are more strongly associated with the sporty trait than ﬁnger respons-
es, and vice versa for the academic trait. According to this account, the association of
individuals and motor responses is suﬃcient to bring about changes in person per-
ception; a prior induction of vision–action ﬂuency is not required. Experiment 2
addresses this alternative explanation.3. Experiment 2: Static images without action
The participants had the same task as in Experiment 1 (identify one person
with a ﬁnger-key response and the other with a foot-key response), but overt
action was removed from the stimuli. The two persons (John or George) were
presented as static images either standing next to a ball (but not kicking it), or
sitting next to a computer keyboard (but not typing). Thus, the sporty and aca-
demic contexts of the scenes were comparable to Experiment 1, but because no
overt action was presented, the vision–action ﬂuency eﬀects that arose from the
compatibility between observed actions and to be executed responses should be
eliminated.
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explanation that the eﬀects on personal-trait judgments were due to an association
of motor responses with individuals. If this were the case, then the same eﬀects as
in Experiment 1 should be observed because the association of individuals to motor
responses was also the same as in Experiment 1. If, however, the eﬀects on personal-
trait judgments were due to a prior induction of vision–action ﬂuency, then a reduc-
tion of the vision–action ﬂuency eﬀects should lead to similar reductions of the eﬀects
on personal-trait judgments.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
Thirty-two students (23 female) ranging in age from 20 to 30 years participated in
the study. All participants ﬁlled out the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (Baron-Cohen
et al., 2001) before taking part in the experiment (see Table 1, row 2, for the mean
AQ and the distribution in the current sample). All other aspects of the participant
selection were as in the previous experiment.
3.1.2. Material and apparatus
The apparatus was identical to that of the previous experiment. The material com-
prised eight static images of the individuals (John or George) standing or sitting next
to the objects instead of the action movies of the previous experiment (see Fig. 3 for
examples). Again, the people could either be facing to the left or to the right. Visual
angles and exposure times were identical to Experiment 1.
3.1.3. Procedure and design
The experimental setup and the course of each trial were identical to the previous
experiment.
3.2. Results
3.2.1. Vision–action ﬂuency
The reaction time (Fig. 4, upper left panel) and error data (Fig. 4, upper right
panel) were analyzed as in Experiment 1. For the analysis of the RTs, trials inFig. 3. Stimuli used in Experiment 2 (static images without action). From left to right: George sitting next
to a keyboard, George standing next to the football, John sitting next to a keyboard, and John standing
next to a football.
Fig. 4. The upper two panels show the vision–action compatibility eﬀects obtained in Experiment 2 (static
images without action) for RTs (upper left panel) and Error rates (upper right panel). The bars on the left
show the data when an individual had to be identiﬁed with a ﬁnger response and the bars on the right show
the data when an individual had to be identiﬁed with a foot response. The white bars show the data when
the person was presented typing on a keyboard. The black bars show the data for when the person was
kicking a football. The lower two panels show the person-trait judgment eﬀects obtained for John (lower
left panel) and George (lower right panel). The bars on the left show the ratings of how sporty a person
appeared. The bars on the right show how academic a person appeared. The white bars show the data for
when the person was identiﬁed by a ﬁnger response. The black bars show the data for when the person was
identiﬁed by a foot response.
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reaction time interval were excluded (7%). The ANOVA revealed a main eﬀect
of Response (F [1,31] = 247, p < .0001, partial eta squared = .89). Participants
were faster in responding with the ﬁnger than with the foot. There also was a
main eﬀect of Observed Action (F [1, 31] = 27.0, p < .0001, partial eta
squared = .47). Participants identiﬁed the individuals more quickly when they
were presented next to a keyboard than when they were presented next to a foot-
ball. Importantly, in contrast to Experiment 1, there was no interaction of
Observed Action and Response (F [1, 31] = 2.6, p = .12, partial eta squared = .08).
However, because the p-value was close to signiﬁcance it is important to note that
this trend for an interaction is in the opposite direction to that found in Exper-
iment 1. That is, responses were faster to identify the individuals seen sitting adja-
cent to a keyboard, and this advantage was larger when making a foot response.
This is the opposite pattern to that expected, and observed in Experiment 1,
based on vision–action ﬂuency/priming.
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p < .05, partial eta squared = .17), showing that hand responses were more accurate
than foot responses. There was no main eﬀect for Observed Action (F [1, 31] = 2.0).
As in RTs, the critical two-way interaction between Response and Observed Action
was not signiﬁcant (F [1,31] < 1, partial eta squared = .02).
3.2.2. Personal-trait judgments
The data for the personal-trait judgment task (Fig. 4, lower panels) were analyzed
as in Experiment 1. The analysis of the diﬀerences between the ratings of John and
George replicated the ﬁndings of Experiment 1. There was a main eﬀect of Trait
(F [1,31] = 18.4, p < .0001, partial eta squared = .19) and a main eﬀect of Person
(F [1,31] = 7.5, p = .01, partial eta squared = .37). Accordingly, the two individuals
were rated to be more academic than sporty, and John generally received higher rat-
ings that George. Again, there also was an interaction of Person and Trait
(F [1,30] = 40.9, p < .0001, partial eta squared = .57) reﬂecting that John was per-
ceived sportier than George, but less academic.
These diﬀerences were again eliminated from the data to assess the eﬀects of
Response on the sporty and academic ratings. This analysis revealed no main eﬀect
of Response (F < 1) and Trait (F = 0). In contrast to Experiment 1, there also was no
interaction of Trait and Response (F [1,31] = 2.4, ns, partial eta squared = .04). If
anything, the data showed the reverse pattern to Experiment 1. Persons identiﬁed
with a foot response were judged slightly less sporty than persons identiﬁed with a
ﬁnger response. Persons identiﬁed with a ﬁnger response were judged slightly less
academic than persons identiﬁed with a foot response.
3.3. Discussion
There were no eﬀects of vision–action ﬂuency in either the RTs or the Error
rates. Likewise, the personal-trait judgments were not aﬀected by the motor
response (foot, ﬁnger) that was required to identify the individuals. This was
the case even though the participants were eﬃciently rating the individuals and
reproduced the general bias of John being rated as sportier, and George as more
academic. Therefore, the present experiment conﬁrmed that the mere association
of motor responses (foot or ﬁnger) to individuals when identifying them did not
suﬃce to aﬀect personal-trait judgments, but that a prior manipulation of vision–
action ﬂuency is critical.
The results of Experiment 2 also supported the idea that the vision–action ﬂuency
eﬀects in RTs and error rates in Experiment 1 reﬂected the compatibility of perceived
actions with the responses required to identify the individuals. The mirror system is
preferentially activated for actions directed at objects if biological motion is present
in the stimuli (Tai, Scherﬂer, Brooks, Sawamato, & Castiello, 2004). Consistently,
when biological motion and all cues for action were eliminated, foot and ﬁnger
responses were equally ﬂuent irrespective of whether the individuals were presented
in the academic or sporty contexts. The presence of objects and eﬀectors that were
also present in Experiment 1 did not aﬀect the ﬂuency of the participants responses.
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biological motion by itself was critical to eliminate the vision–action ﬂuency eﬀects.
For instance, the motion cues in Experiment 1 could have drawn attention to critical
body parts of the individuals (feet, hands) or to the critical objects in the scenes
(football, computer keyboard). Thus, the vision–action ﬂuency eﬀects observed in
Experiment 1 could also have reﬂected interactions between the participants
responses and either the compatible objects (e.g., Tucker & Ellis, 1988, 2001) or com-
patible body parts (Reed & Farah, 1995). But note that both of these notions imply
that the action system of the observers was aﬀected by the stimuli they perceived.
Thus, they do not challenge the view that the personal-trait judgment eﬀects depend-
ed on the prior ﬂuency states of the participants action system while identifying the
individuals.4. Experiment 3: Action movies, implicit personality assessment
In Experiment 1, the participants were required to make explicit decisions by rat-
ing the personal traits (sporty/academic) of the individuals they had observed earlier
in the experiment on a scale. However, many social cognitive processes do not take
place in such an explicit way, and many processes may not be available to conscious/
explicit access. In addition, it is important to show that the attribution of the person-
al traits occurs not only when the participants are required to do so, but spontane-
ously while the participants observed the acting individuals. Therefore, in this
experiment we assessed the personal-trait eﬀects with an implicit measure, where
the participants were never asked to make personal-trait judgments, and where they
had no knowledge that such an issue was investigated.
The ﬁrst part of the experiment was identical to Experiment 1, but afterwards the
participants were not given the short questionnaire that explicitly required them to
attribute the traits sporty and academic to the observed individuals. Instead, the
personal-trait judgment eﬀects were now assessed with a priming task. The partici-
pants were instructed to categorize a variety of scenes as to whether they were sporty
or academic. The scenes were preceded by brief presentations of the faces of either
John or George, which the participants were instructed to ignore. If the traits sporty
and academic had become associated with the two individuals while the participants
were identifying them, then the faces of the two individuals should now act as a
prime and aﬀect the identiﬁcation of the scenes. More speciﬁcally, it should be easier
to categorize a scene as sporty, when the face of the person that was identiﬁed with
a foot response was presented beforehand. In this case the participants responses
were more ﬂuent whenever this person carried out the sporty action than when car-
rying out the academic action. Analogously, a scene should be more easily catego-
rized as academic when the face of the person that was identiﬁed with a ﬁnger
response was presented beforehand.
In contrast, if the eﬀects on personal-trait judgments in Experiment 1 only
occurred because the participants were explicitly required to make such judgments,
there should now be no eﬀects of the face-primes on the categorization of the scenes.
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4.1.1. Participants
Thirty-two students (26 female) ranging in age from 20 to 30 years participated in
the study. All participants ﬁlled out the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (Baron-Cohen
et al., 2001, see Table 1, row 3, for the mean AQ and the distribution in the current
sample) before taking part in the experiment. All other aspects of the participant
selection were as in the previous experiments.
4.1.2. Material and apparatus
The material and apparatus used in the ﬁrst part of this experiment, where video
clips of George and John were identiﬁed with ﬁnger or foot responses, were identical
to experiment one. In the second part of the experiment, 24 new photographs were
used. Four images were proﬁle shots of the faces of John and George, facing either to
the left or the right (visual angle: 2 horizontally, 2 vertically). The remaining 20
black-and-white photographs were shots of 10 sporty and 10 academic scenes (see
Fig. 5 for examples). The horizontal and vertical visual angles of these images varied
between 2 and 3.
4.1.3. Procedure and design
The ﬁrst stage of the experiment, where individuals were identiﬁed with ﬁnger and
foot responses, was identical to that of experiment one. After completion of this
stage, the participants carried out another short experiment, lasting about 5 min
and consisting of 80 trials. In this experiment, the faces of either John or George
were presented for 500 ms at equal rates and in random order. ImmediatelyFig. 5. The upper four panels show examples of the stimuli used in the implicit person priming task
(Experiment 3, action Movies, implicit personality assessment). From left to right: two academic scenes
and two sporty scenes. The lower half shows the time course of the trials in the implicit personal-trait
judgment task of Experiment 3.
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Fig. 5 for the time course of the trials). Participants were instructed that the face
images were now irrelevant to their current task and so should be ignored. Rather,
their task now was to rapidly classify the subsequent scene as sporty or academic by
pressing the 1-key or 7-key on the keyboards numerical block with their left hand.
If they pressed the wrong button or failed to react in the interval of 1000 ms, a short
error message was displayed. Otherwise, the next trial started after the participants
had pressed the zero-key on the numerical key-block with their right index ﬁnger.
4.2. Results
4.2.1. Vision–action ﬂuency
The analysis of the vision–action ﬂuency eﬀects in RTs (Fig. 6, upper left panel)
and Error Rates (Fig. 6, upper right panel) was carried out as in the previousFig. 6. The two upper panels show the vision–action ﬂuency eﬀects obtained in Experiment 3 (action
Movies, implicit personality assessment) for RTs (upper left panel) and Error rates (upper right panel).
The bars on the left show the data when an individual had to be identiﬁed with a ﬁnger response and the
bars on the right show the data when the individual had to be identiﬁed with a foot response. The white
bars show the data when the individuals were presented typing. The black bars show the data when the
individuals were presented kicking a ball. The lower two panels show the RTs (left panel) and Error rates
(right panel) in the implicit personality-priming task (Experiment 3). The bars on the left show the data for
the identiﬁcation of sporty scenes and the bars on the right show the data for the identiﬁcation of the
academic scenes. The white bars show the data for scenes preceded by a photograph of the person that had
to be identiﬁed with a ﬁnger response. The black bars show the data for scenes preceded by the image of
the person that had to be identiﬁed with a foot response.
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react in the given reaction time interval were excluded from the analysis of the
RTs (8%). As in Experiment 1, the analysis of RTs revealed no main eﬀect of
Observed Action (F [1, 31] = 1.1, partial eta squared = .03). The individuals were
identiﬁed equally quickly when they were carrying out typing or kicking actions.
There was a main eﬀect of Response (F [1,31] = 330.2, p < .0001 partial eta
squared = .91). Participants were faster in responding with the hand than with the
foot. The two-way interaction of Response and Observed Action was not signiﬁcant
(F [1,31] < 1, partial eta squared = .01).
The analysis of the Error Rates showed a main eﬀect of Response (F [1,31] = 6.9,
p = .013, partial eta squared = .22). Finger responses were more accurate than foot
responses. There also was an eﬀect of Observed Action (F [1, 31] = 5.9, p < .021, par-
tial eta squared = .16). The individuals were identiﬁed more reliably when they were
presented typing than when they were presented kicking a ball. Finally, the critical
interaction between Response (ﬁnger/hand) and Observed Action (kick/type) was
again signiﬁcant (F [1, 31] = 5.3, p < .028, partial eta squared = .15). Hand responses
were more accurate when typing actions were observed than when kicking actions
were observed. Foot responses were performed more accurately when kicking
actions were observed than when typing actions were observed.
4.2.2. Personal-trait judgments
Fig. 6 shows the RTs (lower left panel) and errors rates (lower right panel) to cat-
egorize the pictures as sporty or academic in the priming procedure. Trials in which
the participants pressed the wrong button or did not react in the given reaction time
interval of 1000 ms were excluded (11%) from the analysis of RTs. The remaining
data were entered into a repeated measures ANOVA with the within-subjects factors
Response (person identiﬁed with a ﬁnger response/person identiﬁed with a foot
response) and Scene (academic scene/sporty scene). It revealed a main eﬀect of Scene
(F [1,31] = 16.9, p < .0001, partial eta squared = .36). In general, the participants
were faster in classifying sporty scenes than academic scenes. There was no main
eﬀect of Response (F < 1), but an interaction of Response and Scene
(F [1,31] = 4.3, p = .046, partial eta squared = .12). The participants were faster in
classifying a scene as academic when the person identiﬁed with a ﬁnger response
was presented beforehand than when the person identiﬁed with a foot response
was presented beforehand. Conversely, the participants were faster in classifying a
sporty scene when the person identiﬁed with a foot response was presented before-
hand than when the person identiﬁed with a ﬁnger response was presented
beforehand.
The Error Rates (Fig. 6, lower right panel) were analyzed with the same ANOVA.
However, no signiﬁcant eﬀects were obtained (for all, F < 1.9). It is noteworthy,
however, that the Error Rates show exactly the same pattern as the RTs. The par-
ticipants were more accurate in identifying an academic scene when the person iden-
tiﬁed with a ﬁnger response was presented beforehand than when the person
identiﬁed with a foot response was presented beforehand. Conversely, the partici-
pants identiﬁed a sporty scene more reliably when the person identiﬁed with a foot
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response was presented beforehand.
We investigated the signiﬁcantRTpriming eﬀects further by examining the eﬀects in
the ﬁrst and second half of the procedure. It is possible that the person-trait priming
eﬀects are stronger in the initial trials because: (a) participants habituate to the irrele-
vant priming faces with repeated exposures; (b) the person-trait eﬀect is transient, only
lasting a fewminutes after the vision–actionmatching processes; and (c) as RTs to cat-
egorize the scenes get substantially faster with repeated exposure, priming eﬀectsmight
get smaller. Therefore, we analyzed separately the ﬁrst 40 trials and the second 40 trials
of the implicit personal-trait priming task. This analysis showed that the interaction of
Person and Scene was highly signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst half of the personal-trait priming
task (F [1,31] = 5.1, p < .032, partial eta squared = .14), but not for the second half
(F < 1, partial eta squared = .01). The eﬀect on error rates was neither signiﬁcant in
the ﬁrst or the second half. However, numerically, the eﬀect in the error rates was also
stronger in the ﬁrst than the second half.
4.3. Discussion
The vision–action ﬂuency eﬀects generally replicate those of Experiment 1. More
importantly, the new priming measure for the vision–action personal-trait eﬀect was
also signiﬁcant. Again, the personality of the observed individuals took on the prop-
erties of the action for which the participants responses were more ﬂuent. Partici-
pants were quicker in judging a scene as academic when they were primed with
the face of the person that was more ﬂuently identiﬁed when carrying out the aca-
demic action (typing) than when carrying out the sporty action (kicking a ball). Like-
wise, participants were quicker in judging a scene as sporty when they were primed
with the face of the person that was more ﬂuently identiﬁed when carrying out the
sporty action (kicking a ball). Consequently, the attribution of personal traits to
individuals on the basis of vision–action ﬂuency occurred even though the partici-
pants had no knowledge that this issue was investigated and the faces of John and
George were irrelevant to the task of scene categorization. Moreover, the present
ﬁndings support the view that the attribution of personal traits on the basis of
vision–action ﬂuency occurred spontaneously during the observation of the acting
individuals, and not only when the participants were asked to do so at the end of
the experiment.
It is worth noting that the personal-trait priming eﬀects were much clearer in the
ﬁrst half of the priming procedure. As noted, there are a number of possible reasons
for this result. First, it may be the case that with repeated exposures to the faces par-
ticipants habituate to them, hence less encoding would produce no facilitation
eﬀects. Second, it may be the case that the personal-trait associated with an individ-
ual via previous vision–action ﬂuency is transient. Hence after a few minutes the
eﬀect might dissipate and third, it could simply be the case that participants are able
to very rapidly encode and categorize the sport/academic scenes after repeated expo-
sure to them, and such ceiling performance reduces the likelihood of detecting any
priming eﬀects. Further work will be necessary to decide between these alternatives.
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The aim of this ﬁnal section was twofold. The ﬁrst aim was to investigate the
hypothesis that autism could be characterized by a mirror neuron dysfunction, that
is, a deﬁcit in mapping perceived actions to ones own action representations (e.g.,
Oberman, Hubbard, McCleery, Ramachandran, & Pineda, 2005; Williams et al.,
2001). Importantly, however, other researchers have argued that autistic individuals
were far from action blind (Sebanz, Knoblich, Stumpf, & Prinz, 2005) and that
brain structures interacting with the mirror system were sub-optimal in autism
(e.g., Arbib & Yahya, 2002). According to this latter view, autistic individuals might
be impaired only in the use of information provided by intact vision–action match-
ing systems.
To diﬀerentiate between these two possibilities, we analyzed the results from
Experiments 1 to 3 with regard to the data from the Autism-Spectrum Quotient
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) ﬁlled out by all participants prior to taking part in the
experiments. The distribution of the current sample corresponded well to the non-
clinical control group assessed by Baron-Cohen and colleagues (see Table 1, for
the distribution of the scores in the current samples).
The AQ presupposes that autism was an extreme case of typical variations in
social-communication disability, and represents healthy and more autistic individu-
als on a continuous scale, with higher scores for individuals closer to the autism end
of the scale. The AQ is derived from 50 diﬀerent questions that reﬂect the ﬁve traits
associated with autism (10 questions each: social skill, attention switching, attention
to detail, communication, and imagination). The AQ has been shown to be a valid
and reliable measure for autistic traits and corresponds well to clinical diagnoses of
autism (Austin, 2004; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). It also traces known autistic deﬁcits
of social cognition such as eye-gaze cuing in the behavior of normals (Bayliss & Tip-
per, 2005; Bayliss, DiPellegrino, & Tipper, 2005).
Thus, if autism is associated with damage to the mirror system, then persons with
more autistic traits should (1) show smaller eﬀects of vision–action ﬂuency in the ﬁrst
part of the experiment and (2) show reduced eﬀects on personal-trait judgments. If,
however, more autistic individuals were impaired only in the use of the information
provided by the vision–action matching processes, then a participants AQ-score
should not inﬂuence the induction of vision–action ﬂuency in the ﬁrst part of the
experiment, but should inﬂuence whether he shows eﬀects in the personal-trait
judgments.
The second aim was to conﬁrm our interpretation that the eﬀects on personal-trait
judgments were due to a prior induction of vision–action ﬂuency. If this were the
case, then there should be a positive relationship between the induction of vision–ac-
tion ﬂuency in the ﬁrst parts of the experiments and subsequent eﬀects on personal-
trait judgments. Those participants that were the most aﬀected by the compatibility
of perceived actions and to be produced responses should also exhibit the strongest
eﬀects on personal-trait judgments.
To investigate both questions, we carried out regression analyses for each of the
experiments. For each experiment, the participants AQ-scores were entered as
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vision–action ﬂuency in the ﬁrst part of the experiments, and (2) the eﬀects on per-
sonal-trait judgments in the second parts. The participants eﬀect on vision–action
ﬂuency was entered as a second predictor in the analysis of the personal-trait judg-
ment eﬀects.
5.1. Method and results
5.1.1. Vision–action ﬂuency
For each experiment, the average vision–action ﬂuency eﬀect in the ﬁrst part of
the experiment was calculated for each participant, separately for the Error Rates
and RTs (i.e., the diﬀerence between RTs/Error Rates when responses and irrelevant
visual-actions were compatible and when responses and irrelevant visual-actions
were incompatible). These values were then entered as dependents into two separate
linear regression analyses (stepwise method) for the RTs and Error Rates with the
participants AQ-scores as single predictors. Table 2 shows the result of this analysis.
The participants AQ-scores were not a signiﬁcant predictor for the participants
vision–action ﬂuency eﬀect in any of the experiments for the RTs or the Error Rates.
Thus, autism and vision–action matching (mediated by mirror systems) do not seem
to be related in this study.
5.1.2. Personal-trait judgments
For the analysis of the eﬀects on personal-trait judgments, the predictors were the
participants AQ-score and the vision–action ﬂuency eﬀect in RTs and Error rates.
The dependent variable that described a participants eﬀect on personal-trait judg-
ments was computed in the following way: for Experiments 1 and 2, the average
of the sporty judgments for the person identiﬁed with the foot-key was subtracted
from the academic ratings for this person, and the academic judgments for the per-
son identiﬁed with the ﬁnger-key were subtracted from the sporty ratings for this
person. For Experiment 3, the eﬀect in RTs in the ﬁrst 40 trials, for which the per-
sonal-trait judgment eﬀect was signiﬁcant, was used as a dependent variable. Here, it
was derived by subtracting the responses to the scenes that were preceded by a com-
patible face (academic scenes, person identiﬁed with a ﬁnger-key; sporty scenes, per-
son identiﬁed with a foot-key) from those preceded by an incompatible face
(academic scenes, person identiﬁed with a foot-key; sporty scenes, person identiﬁed
with a ﬁnger-key). Table 3 shows the results of these analyses.Table 2
The bivariate correlations of the vision–action ﬂuency eﬀects in RTs (middle column) and Errors (right
column) with the participants AQ-score (*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .005)
RTs Errors
Experiment 1 .186 .185
Experiment 2 .121 .003
Experiment 3 .202 .154
Table 3
Result of the regression analysis
Predictors Correlations Coeﬃcients
Experiment 1 Fluency RTs .046
Fluency errors .243* .404**
AQ-score .483*** .533***
Experiment 2 Fluency RTs .087
Fluency errors .207
AQ-score .031
Experiment 3 Fluency RTs .261
Fluency errors .352** .352**
AQ-score .228
The third row shows the bivariate correlations of the personal-trait judgment eﬀects with the respective
predictor variables. The right row shows the standardized beta values of the coeﬃcients that were sig-
niﬁcant predictors of the personality eﬀect (*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .005).
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Experiment 1 (action movies: R = .59; p < .005) and Experiment 3 (implicit personal-
trait judgments: R = .352; p < .05), but not in Experiment 2 (no action cues). In both
Experiments 1 and 3, the vision–action ﬂuency eﬀects were a signiﬁcant predictor of
the subsequent eﬀect on personal-trait judgments (Experiment 1: r = .404; Experi-
ment 3: r = .352; both p < .05). Thus, the more a participants responses (foot/ﬁnger
key to identify George/John) were aﬀected by the irrelevant actions (kicking/typing),
the more his/her personal-trait judgments were aﬀected, irrespective of whether these
judgments were measured explicitly or implicitly.
In addition, the AQ-score of the participants was a highly signiﬁcant predictor of
the eﬀect on explicit personal-trait judgments in Experiment 1 (r = .533, p < .005).
Surprisingly, this relationship was positive. Thus, the personal-trait judgments of
participants with features more symptomatic of autism were even more aﬀected by
induction of vision–action ﬂuency in the ﬁrst part of the experiment. A similar rela-
tionship was, however, not observed in Experiment 3, in which the personal-trait
judgment eﬀects were measured implicitly.
5.2. Discussion
The regression analysis conﬁrmed that the eﬀects on personal-trait judgments
were induced by the prior manipulation of vision–action ﬂuency. That is, there
was a signiﬁcant positive relationship between the vision–action ﬂuency eﬀects in
the ﬁrst part of the experiment and the subsequent changes in personal-trait judg-
ments in Experiment 1 and 3, but not in Experiment 2. Thus, the more the irrelevant
actions inﬂuenced the ﬂuency of a participants responses, the more personal-trait
judgments were subsequently aﬀected. The lack of such a relationship in Experiment
2 also supports the view that the eﬀects on personality judgments were due to prior
interactions of perceived actions and to be produced responses, and not due to inter-
actions of perceived objects or eﬀectors and to be produced responses. Even those
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or implied future actions in Experiment 2 did not show larger personal-trait judg-
ment eﬀects. Thus, any eﬀect on personal-trait judgment seems to be driven by prior
interactions of perceived actions and produced responses.
The results of the regression analyses contrasted, however, with the notion that
autism was characterized by a mirror neuron dysfunction. If this had been the case,
there should have been negative relationships between AQ-score and the induced
vision–action ﬂuency on the one hand, and between AQ-score and the eﬀect on per-
sonal-trait judgments on the other hand. However, there was no relationship
between AQ- score and vision–action ﬂuency, and the relationship between AQ-
score and eﬀect on personal-trait judgments was positive.
These ﬁndings are consistent with the notion that the vision–action matching sys-
tems are not absent in autistic individuals, but that these individuals diﬀer from more
socially adept individuals in the use of the information provided by these systems.
The ﬁnding of a positive relationship between the presence of autistic symptoms
and the eﬀects on personal-trait judgments suggests that persons with the highest
AQ-scores in our (non-clinical) sample had more problems than the AQ-low-scorers
with representing the actions of others independently from the actions they carried
out at the same time.
Of potential importance, the personality-priming task in Experiment 3 appeared
to be less sensitive to interindividual diﬀerences than the explicit measure in Exper-
iment 1. Thus, when the personal-trait judgments were assessed implicitly in the
priming procedure of Experiment 3, there was no relationship with the AQ-scores
of the participants.6. General discussion
The mirroring of the behavior of others is fundamental to ﬂuent social intercourse.
This capacity seems to rely on the matching of perceived actions to the corresponding
action representations of the observer (e.g., Hommel et al., 2001; Rizzolatti et al.,
2000). The subtle mimicking behavior that results from these processes might form
the basis of observational learning, facilitates social interactions, and generates bond-
ing and rapport between persons (e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1999).
The present work goes beyond these ﬁndings and provided evidence that action
mirroring also plays a role in higher social cognitive functions. We have demonstrat-
ed that the compatibility between observed actions and to be executed responses can
inﬂuence the attribution of personal traits to other individuals. In a task in which the
participants had to identify two individuals by pressing either a ﬁnger-key or a foot-
key, we manipulated whether these responses were compatible either with a sporty
action (kicking a ball) carried out by an individual, or with an academic action (typ-
ing on a keyboard). We found that an individual was identiﬁed more ﬂuently when
the irrelevant action he was carrying out was compatible with the response required
to identify him. Although the compatibility eﬀects were generally more pronounced
in the error rates than in the RTs, this result replicated prior reports of perceived
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(e.g., Brass et al., 2000; Kilner et al., 2003). Such eﬀects are expected if perceived
actions were automatically mapped onto the action representations an observer
would rely on to carry out these actions (e.g., Hommel et al., 2001; Rizzolatti
et al., 2000). Consistent with this view, there were no vision–action compatibility
eﬀects when the to be identiﬁed individuals were not carrying out an action (Exper-
iment 2).
Importantly, the compatibility between observed actions and responses also
aﬀected the subsequent attribution of personal traits to the individuals. The person-
ality of the two individuals took on the properties of the action for which they were
identiﬁed more ﬂuently. Two ﬁndings conﬁrmed that the eﬀects on personal-trait
judgments were due to prior interactions of perceived actions and executed responses
in the action system of the observer. First, the regression analysis of Experiment 1
revealed a direct relationship between the eﬀects on personal-trait judgments and
the vision–action ﬂuency eﬀects in the ﬁrst part of the experiment. This relationship
was replicated in Experiment 3, in which the personal-trait eﬀects were assessed
implicitly via a priming task. Therefore, the more a participants identiﬁcation
responses were aﬀected by the irrelevant actions, the stronger was the inﬂuence on
personal-trait judgments at a later point in time, irrespective of whether these per-
sonal-trait judgments were measured explicitly or implicitly.
Second, the personal-trait judgments were only aﬀected when a prior induction of
visuomotor ﬂuency was successful (Experiments 1 and 3). When the observed indi-
viduals were not acting (Experiment 2), there was no evidence for vision–action com-
patibility, and of course, there were no personal-trait judgment eﬀects, either. Note
that even the regression analysis failed to reveal a signiﬁcant relationship between
induced vision–action ﬂuency and subsequent personal-trait judgments in Experi-
ment 2. Thus, even those participants who showed compatibility eﬀects (for instance,
because they attended to either the implied but not performed actions, the objects, or
the eﬀectors present in the scenes) did not show larger personal-trait eﬀects than the
participants who did not exhibit compatibility eﬀects. Although preliminary, this
ﬁnding suggests that the eﬀect on personal-trait judgments depends on actions that
are truly perceived, instead of other stimulus aspects that could, in principle, have
evoked compatibility eﬀects.
These ﬁndings support embodied or simulation accounts of social perception
(e.g., Barsalou et al., 2003; Gallese, 2001, 2003; Gallese & Metzinger, 2003; Iacoboni,
2005; Preston & de Waal, 2002). Accordingly, observers recreate the bodily states of
others on the basis of their own action system to gain information about the goals,
emotional states, and personal traits of these persons. Thus, by simulating the
observed actions of others, such as frowning or smiling, or vigorous or slow ponder-
ous movements, the emotional state of another person may be better understood.
Similarly, our personal-trait eﬀects emerged from a process of vision–action match-
ing, that is, an interaction between observing an incidental action that is irrelevant to
the task at hand with the response to be produced when identifying an individual.
For example, when George can be identiﬁed with a foot response more ﬂuently when
he is seen kicking a ball, he is associated with this sporty property.
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evoked the personal-trait judgment eﬀect. We predicted such eﬀects if observers tend-
ed to misattribute the ﬂuency of their own responses to the actions they have per-
ceived at the same time. If this were the case, other manipulations that only aﬀect
the action system of the observers while identifying the individuals (e.g., making
responses easier or harder in some situations) should lead to similar results on per-
sonal-trait judgments. However, there are other possibilities to explain the vision–ac-
tion personal-trait eﬀect. According to Hommel and colleagues (2001) there is not
only an inﬂuence from perception on action, but also a reverse inﬂuence from action
on perception. Thus, the performance of a foot press might have interfered with the
perception of the incompatible typing action, and/or facilitated the perception of the
compatible kicking action. Theorists of embodied (social) cognition oﬀered a similar
explanation for enhancing eﬀects of mimicry on perceptual measures. Accordingly,
mimicry provides additional activation to the representation of a compatible stimu-
lus (e.g., Barsalou et al., 2003). These notions suggest a more perceptual origin of the
eﬀects. If this were the case, manipulations that aﬀect only the ﬂuency of the percep-
tual processes while identifying the individuals (e.g., increasing contrast) should lead
to similar eﬀects on personal-trait judgments. Indeed, it has been demonstrated that
manipulations that facilitated perceptual processing evoked more favorable judg-
ments about the perceived stimuli (e.g., Mandler, Nakamura, & Van Zandt, 1987;
Reber, Winkielman, & Schwartz, 1998; for a review of related ﬁndings, see Barsalou,
1999, 2003).
The present study also provided some preliminary information concerning the
interindividual diﬀerences mediating the vision–action personal-trait eﬀects. Partici-
pants completed the Autism-Spectrum Quotient developed by Baron-Cohen and col-
leagues (2001). This measures traits associated with autism, with higher scorers being
closer to the autism end of the scale. The AQ has been shown to be a valid and reli-
able measure for autistic symptoms and corresponds well with clinical diagnoses of
autism (Austin, 2004; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). It should be noted, of course, that
because only one of our participants had an AQ-score that fell in the range associ-
ated with a clinical diagnosis of autism, any conclusions we draw here must subse-
quently be conﬁrmed with clinical studies.
We investigated two issues: ﬁrst, whether the AQ-scores are related to the
vision–action compatibility eﬀects assumed to reﬂect mirror processing; and sec-
ond, the new issue of whether the personal-trait eﬀects diﬀer in people with dif-
ferent AQ scores. In the former case, there is some debate as to whether
individuals with autism have intact vision–action matching (mirror) systems.
On the one hand, Williams and colleagues (2001) suggested that individuals with
autism are impaired in representing the actions of others via mirror systems. On
the other hand, others (e.g., Sebanz et al., 2005; The´oret et al., 2005) suggest
that in some circumstances individuals with autism represent even task irrelevant
actions of other people within their action system. Our results support this latter
view. In both Experiments 1 and 3, where signiﬁcant vision–action compatibility
eﬀects were observed, these eﬀects were not related to the AQ-score of the
participants.
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individual diﬀerences were detected. The higher a participants AQ-score, the stron-
ger were the eﬀects on personal-trait judgments he exhibited. Importantly, this rela-
tionship between AQ and personal-trait assessment was only observed in Experiment
1 where explicit/conscious measures were taken. When we measured the personal-
trait associations implicitly via a priming technique, such that participants were una-
ware such information was being assessed (Experiment 3), no AQ diﬀerences were
detected.
Our current working hypothesis is as follows: the initial processes that match per-
ceived actions to the observers action system are intact also in the individuals with
the highest AQ-scores in our (non-clinical) sample. Thus, the relatively rapid and
automatic computations undertaken by mirror systems provide equivalent inputs
to later systems. However, it is the ability to utilize this information that might diﬀer
in individuals with more autistic traits. In Experiment 1, persons closer to the autistic
end of the AQ-scale were more aﬀected by the vision–action ﬂuency eﬀects when they
subsequently made conscious decisions about the personal traits of another person.
Low AQ scorers, on the other hand, appeared to be able to more eﬀectively discount/
inhibit prior vision–action processes when making overt decisions about an individ-
uals personal traits. As noted, this ability of low AQ participants to discount prior
processing is only observed when consciously manipulating information in the
explicit personal-trait task of Experiment 1: all individuals responded similarly when
implicit/pre-conscious processes were assessed in Experiment 3.
Other research would appear to be compatible with this line of thought. For
example, individuals with autism tend to mimic the actions (echopraxia) and words
(echolalia) of others irrespective of their own goals. Thus, the basic perception–ac-
tion matching processes that result in the ability to mimic are not absent in autistic
individuals, but the subsequent appropriate use of this information is lacking. Fur-
thermore, they also confuse the personal pronouns of ‘‘I’’ and ‘‘You’’ (e.g., Kanner,
1943, 1946; for review see Tager-Flusberg, 2000). It follows that autistic individuals
have problems with coordinating separate representations of self and other (Rogers
& Pennington, 1991; Russell & Jarrold, 1999; The´oret et al., 2005; for a review, see
Williams et al., 2001). Consistently, in false belief tasks, autistic children are more
prone than healthy subjects to attribute their own knowledge about a situation to
individuals that would not have this information (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith,
1985; Peterson & Bowler, 2000; for a review, see Frith, 2001). Even more relevant to
our current ﬁndings, Russell and Jarrold (1999) demonstrated that in contrast to
normally developing children and those with mild learning diﬃculties, children with
autism had signiﬁcant problems in diﬀerentiating their own from another persons
actions. Normal children are clearly aware of whether an action was produced by
themselves, or whether they observed someone else produce a similar action. For
individuals with autism their own actions and the actions of others they observe
are not diﬀerentiated.
Our ﬁndings were consistent with this view. Accordingly, the explicit personal-
trait ratings of those with the highest AQ-scores in our sample were most aﬀected
by the induction of vision–action ﬂuency, because they had problems with keeping
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from the representations of their own actions. That is, their own visual–action ﬂuen-
cy when identifying an individual with a foot response while they are observed
undertaking a sporty action, for example, is inappropriately assigned to the viewed
person. Thus, the observed person is perceived to be a more ﬂuent athlete. Of course,
when measured implicitly it is not possible to separate self-action ﬂuency from other
person properties, as these are outside strategic control.7. Conclusions
The present work links lower-level processes typically studied within the domains
of visual psychophysics and motor control to higher-level cognitive processes in
social cognition. Prior work has shown that priming participants with words associ-
ated with the elderly (e.g., wrinkle) can inﬂuence them to subsequently walk more
slowly (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996). Our work has now shown the opposite
eﬀects of vision–action ﬂuency inﬂuencing the attribution of personal traits.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of these processes was their automaticity. This
was reﬂected in two ways: ﬁrst, in all experiments, the actions (kicking/typing) car-
ried out by the two individuals were completely irrelevant to the participants task of
person identiﬁcation. Second, the personality-trait judgment eﬀects could be
observed with both explicit measures where participants were asked to rate the
sporty/academic nature of George and John on a scale, and when implicit measures
were taken in a priming task where participants were never explicitly asked to rate
the personalities of the individuals. Thus, the attribution of personal traits to individ-
uals occurs spontaneously during the perception and production of actions, and the
trait information associated with a person can be accessed rapidly and automatically
even when the persons identity and personality are not relevant to the task.Acknowledgments
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